The animal is poor in world, it somehow possesses less. But less of what? Less in respect of what is accessible to it, of whatever as an animal it can deal with, of whatever it can be affected by as an animal, of whatever it can relate to as a living being. Less as against more, namely as against the richness of all those relationships that human Dasein has at its disposal.
Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, §46
Adapted from a paper for a Heidegger course.
Harriett is a duck. I met her during a depression spell, wandering aimlessly next to the Potomac. I started visiting her because she has a hurt wing, jutting out at an acute angle and preventing her from flying. Concerned, I walked an hour-and-a-half multiple times a week to check on her, to see if she’s eating, if she’s socializing, if she’s having any trouble living her best duck life now. This practice was intended as an act of loving-care, attending to her in the ways appropriate to a duck, and I interpreted her swimming to meet me as cross-species recognition, quacking “I know you” even without the locution. Through it all, Harriett persevered, a duck-on-a-mission, swimming-about and making a life for herself among the Mallards of the Potomac. The last time I saw her, she was healthier than before, defiantly waddling through the river’s pollution, building a coven of friends, and savoring every corn kernel that comes her way.
Harriett is and acts and becomes, unfolding the form-of-life that she inhabits. To unfold is to enact one’s agency in the world repeatedly, dancing the rhythm of being that matters the world. Being buzzes with beings that are -there and -with, always-already situated within a pluricosmos of overlapping and interweaving worlds, meanings and matterings appearing in the unfolding. Drawing from Heidegger, this unfolding depends on the project or pursuit that the creature takes up, orienting themselves to the world as that which they are and marking things in the world as occasions for, or which draw us into, action. For Heidegger, this creature is Dasein, the being-there that asks-and-nervously-answers the question of being; however, I call it the Unique, that which is itself-in-itself and irreplaceable with any other, the matter that matters the world. The Unique forms a world through inhabiting a world, matterings cascading out into the ontology of the cosmos, the Unique of all reflecting the Unique of each.
What does a duck do? Does a duck do? Are the entities in the world significant for a duck? Do they matter? Do they help in the project of ducking? How does one duckily do in the world? It certainly seems if you throw a few grains of corn into the river that it solicits the ducks to eat, that the kernels show up to the ducks as “that which a duck like me eats.” The moment the grains ripple the water, the ducks turn and wade towards it, recognizing it as a delicious feature of their duckish life. Not everything in the Potomac solicits in this way or appears in a duck life as appropriate for a duck – the corn appears as something-to-be-eaten precisely because it is something-to-be-eaten by a duck. It is living life as a duck that causes the corn to appear as it does. Does this mean that ducks have projects or life pursuits like Heidegger’s Dasein? Well, they certainly pursue the corn, and they try to continue living life in a way that is particular to a duck, ducking through their everyday life in a way that changes what things are for. The project of a duck is to live this life, to dwell in the form-of-life of ducks. Ducks do as ducks do, and, in this doing, they constitute a duckish world, a world where things appear as for and not-for ducking.
A duck thus does as Dasein does in ducking. A duck takes up a duck-life through being-in-the-world as a duck. In this ducking, the world becomes the world-for-a-duck, affording opportunities for waddling and wading and flying and eating and doing whatever it is that ducks do when we’re not looking. Harriett’s hurt wing prevents her from flying, blocking the potential for entities to show up as to-be-flown-from, but she still glides and wades, ducking-on in a way particular to Harriett’s unique duckishness. Duck-worlds are not all the same but depend on how individual ducks take up and pursue the project of ducking in the world. Each duck must still learn to duck-in-the-world, and this opens a world that is both grounded in the pursuit of being a duck and in the particularities of being that duck, not just generic duckishness. Harriett finds herself thrown into the world a bird with a broken wing, but every day, she ducks-on. She projects herself onto the possibilities in the world and seeks to live life as a duck, acting on and with things in a way conditioned both by her duckishness and the way she is thrown into that duckishness and into the world. We ourselves human every day. The bee bees, the duck ducks, and the human humans, but being beings in all of them, constituting a world through the project of animaling as the animal-that-one-is, one’s species-being.
A year ago I started visiting Harriett as an act of loving-care. To love another is to attend to their unfolding as that which they are. As what she is, Harriett unfolds a world as she unfolds herself in it, matter mattering matter. To care-for and care-about Harriett is therefore to care for her as the unfolding life that she is. It means attending to the world that she makes and making it possible for her to unfold her life as a duck. Harriett is Unique, and so are the creatures that she is -with, both human and non-human. Caring for each is caring for the Unique that they are, and caring for the Unique that they are means making it possible for them to unfold their life-project, to animal. Recognizing non-humans as Uniques invites us into a new ecological ethic, to prevent ontocide through attending to the world that the Unique is and creates, a pluricosmos of different beings-in-the-world that imbue the universe with mattering.
All worlds are full of Uniques, and Harriett and I are two. I Unique in my humaning and her in her ducking, and just as her presence helped me to human-on when humaning felt untenable, so I have a responsibility to her in her ducking, to be the duck that she is. Harriett is Unique, and so am I, together in this world of beings-in-their-worlds, making the many-worlds together.
All things are full of gods.
Thales of Miletus, quoted in Aristotle’s De Anima 411a
Image: Harriett by me (2023)